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THE BASEL III CONTROVERSY:
A critical assessment of the views of  
Australian regulators
In October 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) released a report entitled 
The Basel Committee’s Response to the Financial 
Crisis: Report to the G20 (BCBS 2010). The report 
announced the development of ‘a reform program 
to address the lessons of the crisis’ and laid the 
foundations of the Basel III accord, which is typically 
portrayed as a ‘great leap forward’ when compared 
to its predecessor, Basel II.
Australian regulators seem to be enthusiastic about 
Basel III (and its predecessors) and the international 
unification of banking regulation. For example, in a 
Regulation Impact Statement, Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) argues that ‘Basel III 
addresses deficiencies in the Basel II framework’ 
and that the adoption of Basel III would ‘reduce the 
likelihood of the need for (and degree of) government 
intervention in any future financial crisis’ (APRA 
2012a). APRA Chairman John Laker has repeatedly 
declared that a ‘stronger Australian banking system 
will emerge from the Basel III reform’ (APRA 2012b). 
Officials from APRA and the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA) have been exceptionally supportive 
of the rapid implementation of Basel III in Australia 
(see, for example, Edey 2011; Byres 2010, 2011). 
Yet many economists and observers believe that 
Basel III does not solve the basic shortcomings of 
Basel II and that international unification of bank 
regulation does not work. 
The Basel III Provisions
Basel III is designed to modify Basel II by taking into 
account lessons learned from the GFC. The Basel 
III proposals aim to boost regulatory capital while 
modifying its definition to ‘emphasise the quality, 
consistency and transparency of the capital base’ as 
well as making common equity the predominant form 
of Tier 1 capital. Another feature is the introduction 
of a countercyclical capital buffer to reduce the 
procyclicality of the banking industry. Basel III also 
requires the introduction of a (non-risk-based) 
leverage ratio as a ‘supplementary’ measure to the 
Basel II risk-based framework. The objectives behind 
the introduction of the leverage ratio are to: prevent 
the build-up of leverage in the banking sector; put a 
limit on the ‘gaming’ of the risk-based requirement; 
and address model risk. 
The proposed liquidity provisions include the liquidity 
coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio 
(NSFR) requirements. The LCR is the ratio of high-
quality assets to projected 30-day net cash outflows 
in an acute stress scenario. The NSFR is the ratio of 
available stable funding — calculated by weighting 
deposits and wholesale funding by reference to their 
stickiness — to required stable funding (based on 
asset holdings etc.). Banks can meet these standards 
by changing their funding profiles, which makes them 
less vulnerable to liquidity shocks.
The views of Australian regulators
One can get a feel for Australian regulators’ views 
on Basel III from the writings and speeches of, 
among others, Malcolm Edey, the Assistant Governor 
(Financial System) of the RBA (Edey 2011) and Wayne 
Byres, the Executive General Manager (Diversified 
Institutions Division) of APRA (Byres 2010, 2011). 
Wayne Byres is also currently the Secretary General 
of the BCBS, replacing Stefan Water in January 2012.
Edey (2011) describes the Basel III proposals as a 
‘major re-think of the existing minimum standards 
This paper critically examines the arguments put forward by Australian regulators in favour of 
Basel III and the Basel accords, more generally. We argue that Basel II contributed significantly 
to the global financial crisis (GFC) and the European crisis. We also suggest that Basel III is not 
a ‘great leap forward’ when compared with Basel II, its provisions will not make banks more 
resilient, its architects have not learned much from the GFC and that the international unification 
of banking regulation is a flawed idea.
IMAD MOOSA, Professor of Finance, School of Economics, Finance and Marketing, RMIT 
KELLY BURNS, Research Officer, School of Economics, Finance and Marketing, RMIT 
JASSA The Finsia Journal of Applied Finance ISSUE 2 2013    27
ongoing collapse of the market of complex structured 
assets’. For one thing, Basel II was fixated excessively 
on capital adequacy, which is a ‘lagging indicator 
of potential trouble’ (Llewellyn 2010). Dolan (2010) 
points out that dozens of the world’s largest banks, 
including many that (on paper) fully met the Basel II 
capital adequacy standards, were devastated by the 
crisis. He also suggests that Basel II allowed banks 
to overstate their true capital and understate the 
risks to which they were exposed. Blundell-Wignall 
and Atkinson (2010) also argue that ‘the Basel risk 
weighting approach has allowed banks to expand 
their leverage almost without limit for all practical 
purposes’. Llewellyn (2010) points out that ‘Basel II 
created incentives for banks to develop off balance 
sheet business and to shift credit risk’, and that ‘it was 
largely the Basel Capital Accord that induced banks 
to engage in securitisation and to develop credit risk 
shifting instruments’. Any prosecutor seeking the 
indictment of Basel II will not have a difficult job to 
do. 
Proposition 2: Basel III is designed to make 
banks more resilient 
Australian regulators believe that banks will be made 
more resilient by the introduction of new capital 
adequacy rules as well as the liquidity and leverage 
provisions. In terms of the capital adequacy rules, we 
certainly agree with the proposition that redefining 
capital to exclude items that do not remotely 
represent or resemble capital is a positive move. 
However, redefining capital and raising regulatory 
capital requirements do not solve the problem that 
Basel III, like Basel II, is capital-based regulation — 
more like buying insurance to pay for the damage 
than avoiding the damage.
Another problem is the calculation of the capital 
ratio on the basis of risk-weighted assets. The risk 
weights are arbitrary, and the whole system boosts 
the procyclicality of the banking industry without 
solving the problem of regulatory arbitrage. On a 
macroeconomic level, the risk-based approach may 
have some adverse consequences for employment 
because it discriminates against small- and medium-
sized firms. Since they are perceived to represent 
greater risk than big firms, banks will have the 
tendency to deprive these firms of credit lines. 
The procyclicality of Basel II results from the 
calculation of the capital ratio on the basis of risk-
weighted assets. As bank assets (loans in particular) 
are assigned higher risk weights during an economic 
downturn, banks are required to hold more capital, 
which weakens their ability to grant loans (and vice 
versa in the case of an upturn). This means that one 
of the proclaimed advances over Basel I (increased 
risk sensitivity) is counterproductive. It seems 
strange to design Basel II in such a way as to make 
for international banking’ and advocates the 
harmonisation of banking rules worldwide. He raises 
the interesting question of why Basel II did not 
prevent the GFC, suggesting that Basel III was a 
response to the lessons learned from the crisis. Byres 
(2010) suggests that the international harmonisation 
of banking rules is important given the global nature 
of the financial system. He defends Basel II by saying 
that it was implemented ‘long after the seeds of 
destruction have been sown’. He finds it surprising 
that ‘Basel II should be scrapped in favour of some 
less risk-sensitive measures’. With respect to Basel III, 
he argues that the accord ‘is designed to make banks 
more resilient’ by increasing the quantity and quality 
of capital, coupled with higher liquidity.
Proposition 1: Basel II did not cause the 
global financial crisis
In their defence of Basel II, Edey (2011) and Byres 
(2010, 2011) echo the views held by the staff of the 
Basel Committee and the Bank for International 
Settlements. The Chairman of the Basel Committee, 
Nout Wellink, has argued that Basel II ‘would have 
helped prevent the global credit crisis from occurring’ 
and that ‘it was a misunderstanding to say that Basel 
II would have allowed the risky practices among 
banks that triggered the crunch’ (Wellink 2008). 
Like Wellink, the General Manager of the Bank for 
International Settlements, Jaime Caruana, suggests 
two reasons why Basel II had nothing to do with the 
crisis: (i) the crisis manifested itself in 2007 on the 
basis of imbalances that had built up prior to the 
implementation of Basel II; and (ii) many countries 
that have adopted Basel II did so in 2008 or later 
(Caruana 2010).
The proponents of Basel II seem to forget that the 
accord was actually approved in 2005 and that 
most banks were fully compliant by 2008. They 
also overlook two other important points, viz. that: 
the originate and distribute model, which was 
encouraged by Basel I and sustained by Basel II, 
made banks more reckless; and the calculation of 
regulatory capital on the basis of risk-weighted assets 
encouraged the accumulation (by banks) of triple-A 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and sovereign 
debt (including Greek bonds). By assigning risk 
weights based on the rankings of the rating agencies 
and giving equal risk weights to the bonds issued by 
Greece and those issued by Germany, Basel II actually 
contributed to the advent of the GFC and the current 
European crisis. 
The sanguine views towards Basel II — as expressed 
by Wellink (2008), Caruana (2010) and our own 
regulators — are not widely accepted. Whalen 
(2007) argues that ‘we do not believe that the 
implementation of the Basel II proposal or anything 
that looks remotely like it would have alleviated the 
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GFC (Walter 2010). If the view is that the crisis has 
demonstrated the importance of these factors, it is 
puzzling as to why several lessons of the crisis have 
been ignored. 
One lesson that has not been learned is that capital-
based regulation is inadequate and that risk-based 
capital regulation can produce disastrous results. A 
related lesson is that it is not a good idea to allow 
banks to use their own models to calculate regulatory 
capital and that it is hazardous to put too much faith 
in internal risk models in general, and value-at-risk 
models in particular. Yet another lesson is that we 
should not depend on the ratings provided by the 
cartel of ratings agencies. It is not clear why the 
BCBS still sees value in these ratings. 
Proposition 4: Basel III is a great leap 
forward
The perception that Basel III represents a major 
overhaul of Basel II is worth challenging. There 
are two considerations here: whether the flawed 
components have been carried forward and whether 
the shortcomings of Basel II have been rectified. 
The answers to these questions are ‘yes’ and ‘no’, 
respectively.
Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) argue that 
‘some of the most fundamental problems with Basel 
I and Basel II have not been dealt with [in Basel 
III]’. These problems include the model framework, 
regulatory and tax arbitrage and the need for more 
capital. And there are more: allowing banks to use 
internal models to calculate regulatory capital; 
reliance on rating agencies; the implementation 
problems; and the exclusionary and discriminatory 
aspects of Basel II. Despite the claims of Basel 
enthusiasts (including our regulators), Basel III is not 
(and neither should it be) about risk management. 
Like its predecessor, it is a pure compliance exercise.
Proposition 5: Banking regulation should be 
harmonised internationally 
Our regulators appear to reject the proposition that 
financial regulation, just like exchange rate regime 
choice, is (or should be) a domestic issue. Instead, 
they advocate the application of the same rules 
to banks in financial systems as diverse as those 
of Bangladesh, Somalia, Malta, Sweden and Saudi 
Arabia. Edey (2011) correctly argues that all countries 
benefit from financial stability but this does not 
imply that all countries should adopt a similar set of 
regulations. It is ironic that while Byres is adamantly 
against adopting country-specific rules, he admits 
that Australia was saved from the GFC, not because 
of international regulation but because of domestic 
policy measures. 
it procyclical, then trying to reduce procyclicality 
by introducing countercyclical capital buffers in 
Basel III. Because it is a product of the risk-weighted 
capital requirement, some economists argue 
that procyclicality can be reduced by calculating 
the capital ratio from total unadjusted assets, 
which Byres (2010) does not favour. For example, 
Goldstein (2008) suggests that one way in which 
countercyclical elements could be introduced into 
regulatory capital requirements is to make capital 
a function of the change in assets, not the risk-
weighted level. 
The introduction of a leverage ratio is a step 
forward, but the problem is that the leverage ratio 
is regarded (by the BCBS and our regulators) as 
being ‘supplementary’ or a ‘backstop to risk-based 
requirements’. Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson 
(2010) point out that ‘the leverage ratio should not 
be thought of as a backstop measure, given how 
effective [or rather ineffective] the capital weighting 
approach has been’. They go as far as arguing for 
the leverage ratio to be the primary ‘capital control 
tool’, pointing out that ‘risk weighting and leverage 
ratio may not sit well together’. Charles Littrell of 
APRA admits that the use of risk-weighted assets 
‘understates true leverage’ (Joye 2013).  
To suggest that the leverage ratio is a supplementary 
tool to the capital ratio is somewhat strange, given 
that when a leverage ratio is in place, it implies 
a corresponding capital ratio. Furthermore, the 
leverage ratio is more objective, easier to calculate 
and more readily understandable than the risk-based 
capital ratio. While there is substantial empirical 
evidence for a negative relation between the leverage 
ratio and bank insolvency, there is no such evidence 
on how insolvency is related to the risk-based capital 
ratio (for example, Evanoff and Wall 2001). 
Regulating liquidity is a step forward because low 
liquidity hampers business and may induce a run on 
bank deposits. The problem here is that the proposed 
liquidity provisions are rather complex in the sense 
that the liquidity ratios are difficult to measure. More 
serious is the fact that the net stable funding ratio 
(NSFR) is based on liabilities rather than assets, 
which is inappropriate. Furthermore, it is not clear 
how the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and NSFR are 
going to be reconciled, given that the former is asset-
based while the latter is liabilities-based. 
Proposition 3: Basel III incorporates lessons 
of the GFC
It is unclear as to why the Basel Committee did not 
recognise the importance of leverage, liquidity, 
underwriting standards, and a variety of other factors 
mentioned by Stefan Walter, the former Secretary 
General of the BCBS, in his (ex post) diagnosis 
of the financial environment in the run-up to the 
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Acharya (2012) argues that ‘India should resist the 
call for a blind adherence to Basel III and persist 
with its (Reserve Bank of India’s) asset-level 
leverage restrictions and dynamic sector risk-weight 
adjustment approach’. The Economist (2011) agrees 
with the views expressed by Acharya, arguing that 
it is not clear why banks in Third World countries 
should be regulated by Basel III when, in fact, they 
have tighter (and more effective) controls. With 
the help of an analytical model, Acharya (2002) 
had earlier found that when capital standards are 
harmonised across countries that have different 
rescue policies, the outcome is a ‘regression to the 
worst regulation’.
A unified implementation of Basel III is not only 
undesirable but also impractical. Watt (2011) argues 
that ‘when push comes to shove, though, there are 
worries individual regulators may tweak certain parts 
of the rules to suit their own banking sectors’. If, as 
Edey (2011) suggests, national regulators eventually 
set the standards as dictated by domestic conditions, 
the Basel rules become irrelevant. The RBA has 
already devised a unique ‘Australian solution’ to the 
problem of meeting the liquidity requirements of 
Basel III by creating a taxpayer-backed line of credit 
to make sure that Australian banks do not run out of 
cash. This is an Australian arrangement that actually 
defeats the purpose of the Basel III liquidity rules.
Any justification for using internationally uniform 
capital standards is more like rhetoric than economic 
sense and substance. The claim that the international 
implementation of the Basel rules is conducive to 
worldwide financial stability, as Edey (2011) argues, 
is doubtful because financial instability has been the 
rule rather than the exception since the mid-1980s 
when the Basel Committee started to flex its muscles. 
Conclusions
The enthusiasm of our regulators for Basel III seems 
to be unwarranted, to say the least. The proposed 
provisions of Basel III are problematic while 
failing to address the fundamental shortcomings 
of Basel II. If the Basel Committee has its own 
way, banks and regulators will keep on receiving 
new provisions for Basel IV, Basel V and so on. 
They are in for enormous regulatory fatigue and 
regulatory capture, respectively. The biggest 
losers will be bank customers who will foot the bill 
for the implementation of the Basel III provisions. 
They will also endure the consequences of future 
financial crises that will strike either because the 
Basel provisions encourage malpractices or, at best, 
because these provisions do not prevent crises or 
reduce their impact. ■  
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